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Contemporary analyses of federalism neglect to consider adequately the
contents and consequences of intrastate structures and institutions. This neglect
of the intrastate aspects of federalism and interstate regulatory competition
leaves impoverished our understanding of contemporary American federalism
and the issue of interstate regulatory competition and competence. My burden
in this paper is to demonstrate that these two related claims are accurate. The
burden of future work in this vein is to explain more theoretically and empir-
ically the role of state institutional and constitutional structures on the efficacy
of interstate regulatory competition. The larger ambition is to connect analyses
and models of intrastate regulatory decisionmaking with contemporary theories
of federalism.
t Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Thanks to
participants at this conference and at a workshop at the Center for Law and Society, University of
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I. WHAT IS MISSING IN MODERN DEBATES ABOUT FEDERALISM?
The topic of federalism in contemporary scholarly discourse is really a pair
of topics: one part is so-called constitutional federalism, that is, the relationship
between the national and state governments as structured by the U.S.
Constitution and interpreted by the courts over two centuries; the other part is
the ubiquitous debate over the proper relationship, as a political, social,
economic-perhaps even moral-matter, between the nation and the fifty states.
While these twin topics represent variations on the same basic theme, that is,
the appropriate relationship in the United States between the national and state
governments, the ways in which we speak about the principles of federalism
when we discuss either constitutional federalism or the federalism "policy" are
very distinct.
Consider just one example. American constitutional federalism presupposes
the states are more or less the same for constitutional purposes. The relation-
ship that is constitutionally crucial is that between one unit of government-the
national government-and the units of state government in the aggregate. The
Tenth Amendment, for example, reserves rights to the states; the nature and
scope of this reservation does not turn on the characteristics of any particular
state. Fundamentally, states are treated equally by the Constitution's structure
and its interpretation; the establishment of equal suffrage in the United States
Senate is merely the most conspicuous manifestation of this equality. This deep
equality is reflected as well in the federal courts' treatment of state regulation
in the dormant commerce clause area, However much sense it would make
as a matter of interstate regulatory policy, no court would permit one state to
discriminate against interstate commerce while limiting another state's ability
to so act. It is a central, if unstated, premise of commerce clause jurisprudence
that all states are equally restricted in their abilities to regulate commerce.
By contrast, an economist writing on a blank slate may well make a case
for the view that certain states in certain circumstances should be entitled to
doctrinal flexibility in the application of the general rule that states may not
"balkanize" the national market through patterns of state regulation.2Likewise,
someone preoccupied with the distributive inequalities among states at a given
point in time may well counsel some constitutional-doctrinal tailoring as well.
However, such a state-specific approach would be anathema to our consti-
tutional law; the reason is essentially that American federalism is, perhaps
ironically, about breaking down lines of distinction among the states.
1. See generally Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294
U.S. 511 (1935).
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When we shift our analytical focus to the "policy" of federalism and, more
particularly, to the prospects and perils of interstate regulatory competition, the
necessity of considering states as distinct, heterogenous spheres of public power
becomes clear. Begin with Justice Brandeis's famous paean to "laboratories of
experimentation," in New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann.3 The "experimentation"
motif stresses that one of the essential values of federalism is that states may
act differently.4 American law and politics understand that states will (and
should) deal with different social and economic problems in different ways.'
To put the point even a bit more strongly than is probably fair, the insistence
in many modem debates about federalism that states be treated as a monolith
confounds efforts to speak sensibly about the policies of federalism and about
the benefits and costs of interjurisdictional regulatory competition. Prescriptive
scholarship about American federalism has not offered a coherent set of rules
and principles to create the incentives and opportunities for optimal regulatory
decisionmaking in the interstate system because American federalism has had
little to say about "states." Instead, American federalism is persistently about
the relationship between the national government and the "states."6 Prudence
counsels, I would argue, greater attention to the relationship between the
national government (which is, itself, made up of many different parts) and the
range of other units of government. These other units include states of very
different shapes, sizes, cultures, histories, and-as the following discussion will
emphasize, institutions and political/legal decisionmaking structures.
But why speak of states qua states at all? A claim which has gained some
recent momentum as a result of a provocative essay by my colleagues Malcolm
Feeley and Edward Rubin is that it has become anachronistic to speak about
federalism because of the increasing irrelevance of states and state boundaries
to debates about social, political, and economic policy.7 We might, they argue,
sensibly speak about decentralization and devolution of power to appropriate
public and private authorities; but we should not continue to pedigree feder-
alism as a constitutional or prescriptive principle or set of conditions and
constraints. Debates about (de)centralization and the devolution of power to
units below the national government implicate the sorts of concerns that are
central to the topics considered at this conference:' What is the level of
3. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
4. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
5. See id.; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERAUSM: A VIEw FROM THE STATES 14-25 (3d ed.
1984).
6. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, What About the "Ism?" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1355 (1994) [hereinafter Briffault, WhatAbout the
"Ism"?.
7. See generally Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
8. I put (de) in parentheses because I want to refer to the term "decentralization" to include not
only that particular normative concept but also "centralization;" in other words, it is the debate about
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government most appropriate to the provision of certain goods and services?
What are the structures that best ensure that goods are provided, and are
provided efficiently, to members of a given community? Which responsibilities
are best assigned exclusively to one unit and which are best shared?
The collection of arguments organized around this claim that federalism is
anachronistic frame an important insight: If the common element which brings
together scholars and policymakers to conferences such as this one is an
interest in the potential of a reconstructed federalism to address fundamental
issues of policy in the modem technological age,9 we ought to attend more
carefully to the question of how facilitating the sort of interstate regulatory
competition and cooperation that will enable American society to proceed more
efficiently and more justly entails constructing a so-called "new federalism." 1"
What are the precise links, though, between the economic and social values of
a reconstructed relationship among spheres of power in American society and
the so-called new federalism? This question is an important one for the modem
scholarly debate about regulatory competition and competence. After all, what
goes on within states is hardly relevant in the long run if we regard state
borders as accidental, as anachronistic and unstable; if we, on the other hand,
take more seriously the regulatory activities of states as states, then we can see
the structure of American federalism as much more fundamental to under-
standing how best to partition power among individuals and units of govern-
ment within the nation.
Those who insist that federalism is anachronistic have neglected their
American political and constitutional history. Federalism was not, after all, an
analytic construct cooked up by the likes of Charles Tiebout or Daniel Elazar;
it is a central element of American constitutional ideology, perhaps the most
central element. Professor Briffault overstates the point only a little when he
notes that "[flederalism, or, more accurately, the federal structure, just is. It
does not need an argument. The structure exists and defines our govern-
ment." 1'
Let me suggest, though, there are several critical reasons for attending not
merely to decentralization/devolution but to federalism in considering issues of
regulatory competition and competence.
The federalist structure that we have inherited from our Constitution and
our constitutional tradition is critical in shaping debates about (de)centrali-
decentralization of power, rather than decentralization per se, that I want to capture.
9. For evidence that this interest is growing in volume, and perhaps in amplitude as well, see
generally SHAPIRO, supra note 4, and the sources cited therein.
10. Sources that capture the nature of these essential questions are legion. Particularly interesting
recent discussions include PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995), especially Chapters
2 and 8; VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1991); THOMAS R. DYE,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETiTION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990).
11. Briffault, What About the "Ism"?, supra note 6, at 1348 n.161.
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zation. There are three essential reasons for this. First, the fact of fifty states
(leaving entirely aside, for the moment, debates about the "sovereignty" of
these states) creates a specific, constructed universe in which interstate
regulatory competition takes place; this is a particular geographic and
demographic market that can, no matter how sophisticated becomes our
technological capacity for travel and communication, be located and described
rather precisely. 12 Second, the diversity of the fifty states and its impact on
this regulatory universe make debates about federalism, and not merely
(de)centralization, relevant. Third, there is institutional structure found in these
fifty states. Some of this structure exists because of federal constitutional com-
mand,13 some exists because of the constraints imposed by national legislative
command; but the vast range of intrastate structure is a product of individual
state choice. This choice is manifested in state constitutional design, state
political structure, and in other institutional arrangements that shape the
policymaking process within the state. The bulk of my essay is taken up with
considering this third feature; let me make a few sketchy remarks, however,
about the first two features as well.
As far as .the fact of the fifty states is concerned, the nexus between
federalism and arguments about (de)centralization is fundamentally a part of the
very structure of the American constitutional order. Critics of this nexus are
asking the wrong question. The proper question is not: If we were starting
from scratch and designing a system of government, would we construct the
national government and the states and distribute power to them as the
Constitution of 1787 does? Rather, it is: How does the existence of the fifty
states construct the argument about the allocation of power? 4 As Larry
Kramer puts the point: "The simple existence of independent states within the
larger nation affects the dynamic of American politics ...by encouraging
12. I am eliding here three fundamental questions that implicate this description of the fifty states
as a circumscribed universe in which competition takes place: (1) immigration/emigration and the
corresponding malleability of this "market"; (2) expansion of the United States through the addition of
new states or, at least, new quasi-state territories (it should be remembered, of course, how rare are
"new" states of this Union); and (3) the globalization of regulatory competition which may make the
interstate regulatory competition correspondingly less exclusive.
13. For example, the requirement of strict electoral equality, the so-called "one man, one vote"
requirement first established in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. Describing the state's existence as the "fact" that is intrinsically relevant is an oversimplifica-
tion, to be sure. It is not the geographical fact that states exist, of course, but rather the ascription by
the Constitution's design of a status. Some of this status is instantiated by clear Constitutional power:
For example, the role of the states in the amendment process is prescribed in Article V. U.S. CoNsT.,
art. V. See Henry Monaghan, We the People[sJ, Original Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 121 (1996). Some of this status is, while constitutionally enshrined,
considerably less clear: for example, the Tenth Amendment, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993), and the Guarantee Clause, see Deborah
J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1988). For my purposes, it is sufficient to observe as the "fact of the fifty states" the
constitutionally structured status of the states.
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political movements to develop alone state lines and to utilize the machinery
of state government to achieve their goals." 5
The size and shape of the union and its fifty states are also central, if
undervalued, aspects of the intrinsic importance of states qua states in under-
standing federalism. Notwithstanding the incessant march toward technological
sophistication and the borders that are forever falling, we should keep firmly
in mind that as of 1996 the sheer breadth of the nation, over two hundred and
forty million people strong, confounds attempts to consolidate all political and
economic power in a small space and in few hands. Consider, for example, the
recent battle for the Republican presidential nomination. The candidates are re-
minded that the primary system, however compact and however affected by the
modem media age, is still a very labor-intensive, and redundant process.
The diversity of states must also be kept in mind if we are trying to
reconcile debates about federalism and debates about (de)centralization. States
are, needless to say, different in population, in geography, and in location;
they have different cultures, identities, and aims. The essential insight of
classic economic arguments for state variation, captured in one part of Charles
Tiebout's hypothesis about the optimal size of local governments 6 and in
Albert Hirschman's analysis of the role of exit, voice, and loyalty in
constructing local politics and decisionmaking processes, 7 is that communities
are different, and these differences are essential and reasonably impervious to
efforts at homogenization. 18 Moreover, we need not dismantle the elegant
argument in favor of the Union as a national community-as "We the People"
not "we the states"-to insist that interstate diversity is a persistent fact of
American political and social life. 9 The diversity of states represents more
than merely the banal fact that there are lots of different people and different
communities in this country; rather, interstate diversity is significant because
much of this diversity-and the variation and heterogeneity that results-is
captured within state borders. And the resilience of these borders to change is
striking. The citizens of my state-California-have been debating whether to
split into two for decades; nothing has, nor likely will, happen, though. Nor
do states in the New England region, notwithstanding issues and personalities
15. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1547 (1994); see also
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 9 (Daniel 1. Elazar et al. eds.,
1969).
16. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
17. ALBERT O. HIRSCMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
18. For an extended analysis of the political economy of interjurisdictional competition on its bears
on the relationship between states and localities, see the discussion in Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 473,
508-28 (1991) [hereinafter Been, Land Use Exactions].
19. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 10, at 5-68; WILLIAM IKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN,
OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964); Daniel J. Elazar & John Kincaid, Covenant, Policy and
Constitutionalism, 10 PUBLIuS 3 (1980).
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in common, and notwithstanding the presumed synergies that would accompany
collaboration, seem to be anxious to consolidate into one "super state." A
truism of American political life is that citizens appear to be reasonably
patriotic about their state and its borders.'
More remains to be said about these two broad features of federalism
described above. On the one hand, I may have overestimated the degree to
which these two features are immutable and therefore resist reconstruction in
a way that would maintain the divergence between debates about federalism
and debates about (de)centralization. On the other hand, it may be that one or
both of these features (or others not described) may so overwhelm the issues
that preoccupy lawyers and social scientists that scholarly debates about old and
new federalism and about interstate regulatory competition, are marginally
relevant at best and profoundly pollyannish at worst. I am content to leave
these two features alone for now. I want to concentrate on the third described
feature of the federal/state relationship, one that is undervalued in contempo-
rary debates about federalism: the role of intrastate political institutions.
II. INSTITUTIoNAL DIMENSIONS OF STATE REGULATORY PROCESSES
Metaphors about American national and state governments that stress its
monolithic, hegemonic character-Hobbes's "Leviathan" comes to mind-are
misleading. American government is a nexus of institutions; it is a plurality of
cross-cutting, but often distinct, loci of function and power.21 Moreover, the
institutions are not machines; they are made up of humans, each with their
identities, agendas, cultures, and conceptions of roles.' While these observa-
tions are elementary, they are important to keep in mind when we are trying
to deconstruct and reconstruct abstract ideas like "federalism" and "(de)cen-
tralization."
If we are to say something meaningful, positively and normatively, about
federalism, we must have at least a rough sense of the nature and function of
the various political institutions that form American government. Better yet,
20. For an intriguing analysis of the "covenantal basis of American federalism," suggesting some
reasons, beyond rational self-interest, why Americans cling to the idea of federalism (and not merely
decentralization), see OSTROM, supra note 10, at 53-68. Daniel Elazar's work is relevant in this regard,
as well. See generally ELAZAR, supra note 5.
21. See the discussions-from very different starting points-of the nature of institutions,
institutionalbehavior, and American government inA NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING POLITICAL
INSfITUTIONS FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (Steven L. Erwin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1993); James G.
March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: OrganizationalFactors in PoliticalLife, 78 AMER.
POL. Sci. REv. 734 (1984); Terry Moe, Politics and the Theory ofOrganizations, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
106 (1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization, in
ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 173-78 (Oliver E.
Williamson ed., 1990).
22. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH 231-64 (1992); JAMES G. MARCH
& JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSITIUTIONS (1989) [hereinafter MARCH & OLSEN,
INSTITUTIONS].
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with a more complete set of institutional theories we can make informed
judgments concerning the appropriate distribution of power and the construc-
tion of the proper set of incentives among units of government-national, state,
and local. This is not necessarily a plea for more abstraction. Institutional
theories can be grand or modest.' We may aim toward the sort of institution-
al theory that explains everything and thus sweeps all issues of federalism and
regulatory competition within its scope, or we may merely aim to understand
particular elements of institutional design and behavior. My only point is that
sensitivity to the structure of institutions and institutional interrelationships is
required to inform a sophisticated analysis of federalism.
A. The Relevance of Intrastate Institutional Capacity on Public Policy
Although the notion that the design and performance of political institutions
influence regulatory outcomes seems unassailable, it has proven difficult to
measure whether, and how, this influence takes place.24 There are several
studies which indicate that certain aspects of legislative structure, such as the
increased professionalism of legislatures and the expansion of legislative staff
have influenced legislative outcomes.' Specifically, states with a greater
institutional capacity are likely to innovate and, to the extent that innovation
has an impact on the state's competitive position vis-a-vis its competitors, such
innovation will facilitate interstate regulatory competition.'
Beyond institutional capacity that can be measured by studying particular
legislative reforms, we have fewer empirically demonstrable reasons for
confidence that political institutions affect regulatory outcomes. 7 Yet there
23. See generally MARCH & OLSEN, INSrTUTMONS, supra note 22.
24. See R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, When and How Do Institutions Matter?, in DO
INSTITUTIONS MATrER? GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 445 (R. Kent
Weaver & Bert A. Rockman eds., 1993) [hereinafter WEAVER & ROCKMAN, Do INSrr ONS
MATTER?]. For a classic, empirically-rich examination of the role of, interalia, institutions in regulatory
policymaking, see essays in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
25. See, e.g., Keon S. Chi & Dennis 0. Grady, Innovations in State Governments: Their
Organizational and Professional Environment, in THE COUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK
OF THE STATES: 1990-91 (1991) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1990-91]; Virginia Gray, State
Legislatures and Policy Innovations, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM (Joel
H. Silbey ed., 1994); Virginia Gray & David Lowery, The Corporatist Foundations of State Industrial
Policy, 71 SOc. SCi. Q. 3 (1990); Paul Sabatier & David Whiteman, Legislative Decisionmaking and
Substantive Policy Information: Models of Information Flow, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 395 (1985).
26. See Gray, supra note 25, at 1347-49. This connection between intrastate institutional capacity
and policy outcomes is likely to be especially strong where states have an exclusive or nearly exclusive
role in promulgating and implementing policy in the area. Land use or education might be examples
here. By contrast, in the welfare or environmental area, where responsibilities are shared or where the
dominant paradigm of regulatory decisionmaking is national, then modulating intrastate capacity, without
changing the incentives of national policymakers, is likely to be substantially less important. See
generaliy John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean AirAct, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183
(1995) (discussing federalism in environmental area).
27. The dearth of political science on the connection between intrastate political processes and
policy outcomes is noted by Virginia Gray. See Gray, supra note 25.
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would seem to be quite plausible theoretical reasons why they should. First, to
the extent that regulatory innovation is partly a product of institutional
capacity, then there is a variety of elements that make up this capacity-not
only within the structure of the legislature," but in other "branches" and in
other decisionmaking locations, such as the bureaucracy and the courts.29 The
issue, of course, is not merely about "quantity," but "quality." Second,
diffusion of power throughout the state governmental system cuts both in the
direction of limiting the ability of states to take regulatory initiatives centrally,
quickly, and durably;3" on the other hand, it may promote experimentation
through risk-taking,31 allocation of appropriate expertise through the logic of
comparative advantage, and in facilitating more appropriate policy through
redundant spheres of power. To the extent that intrastate institutional
mechanisms promote this diffusion of power, there is an impact-whether
positive or negative-on policy outcomes. Third, and perhaps most important-
ly, policymaking processes (and the outcomes they generate) take place within,
and in the shadow of, political institutions. The framework of institutions
within the state political system is inescapable. Hence, one would be hard-
pressed to separate out policy outcomes from institutions on the grounds that
influences on the policymaking process are wholly "externally" formed, or
that, by contrast, decisions take place in a vacuum, springing up fully formed
from the well-intentioned views of policymakers rather than through a more
complicated, bounded, and institutionally constructed process. Institutions
surely influence policy outcomes, and the institutions that are formed within the
structure of state government are influential. 2 The key question is how do
these influences manifest themselves? How, in particular, do institutions shape
and influence competitive federalism?
We ought to think about intrastate institutional mechanisms as pushing and
pulling in two separate directions. In one sense, these mechanisms are designed
to, and have the function of, facilitating interstate regulatory competition. For
example, the ability of a state to act centrally, quickly, and durably represents
an enormous positive capability in the interstate regulatory marketplace. Let us
28. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY
THEY Do IT (1989).
29. See, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994).
30. See, e.g., Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States:A Diffusion Study, 67 AMER. POL. SCl. REV.
1174 (1973).
31. See T. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITON AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990). For
different perspectives on this risk-taking and innovation element of federalism, see Richard Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-the-Bottom' Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Ed Kitch, Regulation, the American
Common Market and Public Choice, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
32. See generally R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, Assessing the Effects of Institutions, in
WEAVER & ROCKMAN, Do INSTITUTIONS MATIER?, supra note 23; R. Kent Weaver & Bert A.
Rockman, When and How Do Institutions Matter?, in id. at 445-61.
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consider these three elements in turn. The ability to act centrally-i.e., without
disabling conflict among the state government and local governments-is
important. Truly heterogeneous states such as New York, Illinois, and
California, face relentless issues of intrastate governmental variety and conflict;
state/local conflict limits the capacity of the state to move forward with a
unified voice. In certain contexts, this fragmentation can impede effective state
competition; it can also impede salutary collaboration, where such collaboration
requires a uniform state response. On the other hand, this fragmentation need
not be an unadulterated evil for competitive or collaborative regulatory
purposes. Surely Justice Brandeis had in mind, in his vision of states as experi-
mental laboratories, that these laboratories would have separate parts: these
parts, in mediating interlocal, intrastate interests, may reflect an asset, rather
than a liability. Moreover, the reality of late twentieth century regulatory
competition reveals many compacts struck among localities and states, localities
and other localities, and localities and the federal government. The notion that
interstate regulatory competition involves solely the states qua states is naive.
Related to the point about centralization versus fragmentation is the point
about quick, determined initiative. Mediating competing intrastate demands-
including not only local governments but demands of other interested groups
such as the state bureaucracy, lobbyists, third parties, and the like-is a time
and resource-intensive process for state decisionmakers. Surely the more
homogeneous state is, at the very least, better able to bring their statewide
interest more quickly to the economic table. Moreover, where states sharing
common interests can collaborate on a regional basis, their capacity to secure
economic benefit, often at the expense of the more fragmented, internally con-
tentious states, expands.
Durability is a final, yet very important, element in the mix as well.33 A
key dilemma in the process of interstate regulatory collaboration is the
reliability of interstate agreements. Deals struck among states, after all, are
intrinsically precarious; they rely on continuing support from the political
principals within a state. To be sure, there are various legal constraints on the
capacity of states to violate their agreements. The Contract Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is, while often obscure, one such constraint. However, the politi-
cal constraints on the ability of states to enter into binding, durable agreements
make the processes of interstate regulatory collaboration problematic.
Resolving these complex problems and developing governance structures to
improve the legal policies and economic capacities of states to strike deals and
to rely upon such interstate agreements is key in the modem prescriptive
33. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. ECON. 875 (1975); Barry R. Weingast & William Marshall, The Industrial
Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL.
ECON. 132 (1988).
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analysis of regulation and of federalism.
This discussion has focused on the role of intrastate institutional mecha-
nisms to facilitate interstate regulatory competition. The other direction,
however, toward which these mechanisms pull is to constrain such competition.
Although conventional theories of federalism teach us that states have an
interest in expanding their power and thereby competing more effectively in the
regulatory marketplace, many intrastate institutional mechanisms constrict the
state's ability to so compete. There are a number of reasons to believe these
strictures have not arisen accidentally. Take, for example, the common
prohibitions in state constitutions against special legislation. There are good
economic reasons for permitting a state to target certain localities through
special legislation. 4
Perhaps the best way to consider how certain intrastate mechanisms can
facilitate interstate regulatory competition is by example. Suppose a municipali-
ty we will call Xanadu, located in a state we will call Oceana, fears a decline
in its capacity to raise revenues for the financing of important public goods.
This decline is, let us say, the product of two distinct, but significant, factors.
Factor number one: a shrinking tax base has left the city with an inadequate
source of tax revenue. Of course, expanding the rate will encourage just the
sort of emigration that Xanadu seeks to avoid. Factor number two: the
phenomenon of unfunded mandates imposed by the state has increased the
demands on municipalities without a corresponding allocation of resources to
finance these greater demands. Xanadu imposes a business license tax of $x per
annum on all financial institutions doing business within its borders. It also
imposes a hotel tax of $y on customers who stay in hotels in the municipality
(suppose Xanadu is located near a spectacular waterfall that makes its location
especially attractive to visitors).
Let us put to one side the standard economic arguments in the public
finance literature that explain why and in what circumstances such local
financial decisions would be: (a) inefficient; and/or (b) unlikely for various
economic reasons (Tiebout hypothesis, etc.)., 5 The connection I want to
explore here is between local regulatory goals and the goals of the state. From
the state's standpoint, these local regulations are problematic. They may be
appropriate, given the state's interests in protecting the fiscal durability of
localities and also its interest in enabling the locality to meet its (unfunded)
obligations. After all, these taxes would hardly represent the first time that the
costs of the state's regulatory requirements on localities would be passed
through private businesses to consumers. Yet the state faces a hard fiscal
decision, one that does not concern merely its choice with respect to Xanadu
34. See CLAYTON GILLETTE, LOcAL GOvERNMENT LAW 239-63 (1994).
35. See supra note 16.
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and its predicament but also its choices across a range of real or putative policy
issues that may arise. We could conjure up a number of different scenarios in
which Xanadu's tax decisions will run afoul of state concerns and, in
particular, will hamper the state's ability to compete in the interstate regulatory
marketplace. So, in light of this, what is the state going to do?
It is tempting to observe that a state would have plenary authority over such
local taxing decisions and that if the state fears exploitative local policy, it
would just sweep these municipal decisions to one side through appropriate
legislation. However, it is not clear that any state-including my fictional state
of Oceana-would be empowered to do so. The architecture of state and local
power in modem state constitutionalism is more complicated than the maxim
that "local governments are mere administrative arms of the state government"
indicates.36 Moreover, it is not clear that Oceana would, in any event, have
the political incentives to diminish local authority through legislative fiat, even
if it would serve the state's general economic interest to do so. The key to
unlocking both of these difficult issues is intrastate political and legal
institutions.
Consider, first, the issue of "authority." Most state constitutions have home
rule guarantees.37 In those states that have such provisions and in which the
courts develop their own definition of what constitutes local or municipal
affairs, many of the hardest fought legal disputes between local governments
and the state involve local taxing decisions. Sometimes the issue is whether
the municipality should enjoy taxing authority alongside the state; other times
the issue is whether the good or activity should be taxed at all." In any event,
the constitutional structure of home rule presents a difficult range of issues for
decisionmakers who seek to protect state regulatory flexibility.
Next, consider the issue of "political incentives" and how institutional
structure intersects with these incentives. Legislators are elected from single-
member districts in which presumably the interests of local citizens (as well as
whatever interest groups clamor for attention) are represented. Moreover, the
legislature is a marketplace in which trades are struck, deals are made, and
legislation is shaped through a process of mutually reinforcing, structure-
induced quid pro quo. What both of these institutional principles mean for the
relationship between state and local relations are critical. On one hand, the
multiplicity of local interests in the legislative marketplace makes interlocal,
intrastate deals essential. Local interests in taxing businesses and individuals
36. See infra Subsection II.B.5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Supremacy, Local Sovereignty: Reconstructing
State/Local Relations Under the California Constitution, in CONSITTiONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA
401 (R. Noll & B. Cain eds., 1995) [hereinafter CoNsTrrIONAL REFORM].
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are represented in important respects in the legislative process through locally
elected representatives; and Xanadu, like other municipalities, has its
representatives. However, the state legislative process is institutionally
structured to take account of statewide interests as well. One of these structures
is the office of the governor; another is the requirement of a balanced budget;
a third is statewide political parties. These, and other structures, work to
ameliorate the impact of local capture of the state legislative process. Yet the
structure of representation limits how successful the state legislative process
can be in limiting local interests.
To bring another significant intrastate institutional structure into the mix,
consider the impact of initiative-form lawmaking on the decisions of Oceana
and Xanadu. Suppose citizens of Oceana fear the impact that Xanadu's tax
squeeze on vacationers and businesses will have on the economic vitality of
their own communities. They may propose initiative legislation to restrict the
domain of local decisionmaking, not necessarily in the name of promoting the
state's public interest, but merely in order to safeguard their own local self
interest. The story of that part of Proposition 13 in the state of California that
deals with local taxing power reveals the distrust that voters have in other
communities, wholly apart from whatever larger, statewide interests they may
have.
The incentives faced by voters in statewide elections also favor the
contraction of local power. State voters cast their ballot on a statewide basis in
an initiative election. This phenomenon alone represents a stark distinction in
the structure of incentives that exist in direct versus representative democracy.
There is no legislative/local nexus where voters cast their ballots statewide. To
be sure, we know what the voters of Xanadu will have to say if they vote on
a statewide initiative. But the influence of the voters of Xanadu will turn on the
extent to which they command a majority in the state electorate-and less on
the extent to which they can sway voters from other local communities over to
their side.
Surely the initiative system is, from a regulatory competition standpoint,
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enables voters to make choices on
behalf of statewide interests and thereby limits the ability of parochial interest
groups to further their aims through, for example, capture of the legislative
process. 40 On the other hand, the voters have notoriously limited time
horizons. They will often thwart the legislative process-and thus representative
democracy-by what in retrospect seem to be rather instinctive, and uniformed
decisions. The vast majority of those who carefully study the American
policymaking process regard the decision to impose legislative term limits to
be of this variety. In any event, the point is that the opportunity for voters to
40. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
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short-circuit the legislative process by engaging in alternative forms of
lawmaking may inhibit the capacity of state policymakers, charged with the
responsibility to safeguard the public interest, from taking sensible steps.
Other institutional mechanisms also have this sort of double-edged sword
characteristic. Take the example of bicameralism. Most of the literature on
bicameralism in modem legislatures either assumes or explains why assigning
lawmaking roles to two legislative bodies, rather than one, increases the costs
of legislative success and therefore impedes the legislature's ability to move
quickly. On the other hand, of course, the requirement of bicameralism makes
legislation harder to repeal and therefore increases the durability of legislative
bargains once struck.41 Whether the equilibrium ends up facilitating or
hampering the state's ability to regulate efficiently is an empirical question.
Hence, bicameralism (which is the norm in all but one American state)42 may
simultaneously facilitate and constrain the state's ability to compete effectively
in the interstate regulatory marketplace.
B. Features of State Institutions and Regulatory Processes
In order to generalize about intrastate aspects of interstate regulatory
competition and about the role of intrastate institutions, we need to keep in
mind some basic features that are found in each state. These institutions are
structured differently and have different regulatory impacts depending on
circumstances unique to each state; indeed, that is precisely the point of this
exercise: to consider how states differ from one another with respect to
institutional design and function. Of course, states do share a number of institu-
tional features which bear on their capacity to compete with other states for
people, resources, and economic goods. The aim of this section, however, is
to consider both state variation and state similarity; each is relevant to
understanding the intrastate aspects of interstate regulatory competition.
A caveat: The following discussion of the various features of intrastate
decisionmaking touches lightly on a number of complex issues that deserve
more extensive treatment in their own individual right. The purpose of this
discussion is suggestive; I wish to point to a variety of institutional arrange-
ments and features which, as I think more careful study will bear out, influence
and structure interstate regulatory competition in ways that contemporary
debates do not yet adequately consider.
41. See generally Weingast & Marshall, supra note 33.
42. See NEB. CONST. art. .
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1. Legislatures and Lawmaking
All states, with the exception of Nebraska, have a bicameral legislature.43
In all states, bills must be passed by majorities in each legislative chamber and
presented to the governor for his signature.' All states provide for some
system of override in the event that the governor vetoes proposed legisla-
tion.4' This bicameral structure of the lawmaking process ensures that in
nearly every state the process for the consideration and enactment of legislation
is organized around a similar set of incentives and interchamber checks and
balances.'
Beyond the basic structural uniformity, though, lie a number of important
differences. These differences make it impossible to assimilate the legislative
structure of state governments into a general theory of "how legislation is made
in the fifty states." One difference is size: States differ dramatically in the
numbers of lawmakers in their legislative chambers. A sample of this
difference is indicated here:
TABLE 147
Upper house Lower house Total
Alabama 35 105 140
California 40 80 120
Connecticut 36 151 187
Delaware 21 41 62
Massachusetts 40 160 200
Nebraska unicameral 49
Nevada 21 42 63
New Hampshire 24 400 424
Variations in size of the upper chamber range from 20 (Alaska) to 67
(Minnesota), while variations in the size of the lower chamber range from 40
(Alaska) to 400 (New Hampshire).
While the strict requirement of electoral equality ensures that the
43. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES: 1993-94, at 50-52
(1994) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-94].
44. Id. (describing differences in state procedures).
45. Id.
46. There is a rich literature, much of it growing out of social choice theory, on the functions and
impact of bicameralism on the legislative process. See, e.g., KENNETH I. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDuAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS
(1971); Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Bicameralism andMajoritarianEquilibrium, 74 PUB. CHOICE
169 (1992); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 145 (1992); William H. Riker, The Justification of Bicameralism, 13 INT'L POL. SCI. REV.
101 (1992).
47. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-1994, supra note 43, at 113-14.
Constructing a New Federalism
constituencies represented by each member is roughly the same,48 states are
free to construct the membership of their legislative chambers however they
wish.49 To the extent that we believe that the number of legislators matters for
the business of lawmaking, we should consider further the significance of
variation in the size of their respective legislative assemblies.
Another difference among state legislatures is the limitation on terms of
office. A rash of state "term limits" initiatives over the past few years has left
states in very different positions with respect to the longevity of state
lawmakers. It is only very recently that these state term limits have started to
kick in; hence, we can only speculate as to the impact that intrastate term limits
will have on state policymaking. Informed critics suggest that the effects will
be severe."° It is argued that the executive branch will enjoy more power, and
that powerful organized interest groups-including entrenched semi-permanent
staff-will maintain and expand their influence over the legislative process as
neophyte legislators scramble for information and for campaign funds." The
net result, these critics suggest, is the weakening of the legislative process and
the replacement of expert lawmakers with inexperienced, ineffective newcom-
ers. Defenders of term limits, of course, offer answers to these critiques.52
More interesting for my purposes is not the arguments for or against term
limits, but rather the consequence of interstate variation with respect to state
legislative terms. For the moment, nineteen states have term limits on state
legislators.53 Although it has not been a preoccupation in the literature on
term limits, we should consider with care the impact of legislative term limits
on the ability of states to compete and collaborate in the interstate regulatory
marketplace.
A third difference is the structure of intralegislative lawmaking. Just from
what we can observe by looking at the rules and practices "on the books," we
see substantial differences in how state legislators make laws. One key
48. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964).
49. It should also be noted that states are free to expand or contract the number of legislative
chambers. Although only one state presently acts unicamerally, there have been a number of proposals
in other states to replace bicameral lawmaking with a unicameral legislature. For a history of the
unicameral legislature movement in California, see David Brady & Brian Gaines, A House Discarded?
Evaluating the Casefor a Unicameral California Legislature, in CONSTrTTONAL REFORM, supra note
39. While I am not aware of proposals to expand the number of legislative assemblies, there is nothing
constitutionally sacrosanct about the bicameral system in the states.
50. See, e.g., Linda Cohen& Matthew Spitzer, Ter Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477 (1992); Nelson W.
Polsby, Restoration Comedy, 102 YALE LJ. 1515 (1993) (reviewing GEORGE WILL, RESTORATION:
CONGRESS, TERM LIMITs, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELmERATVE DEMOCRACY (1992)).
51. For an especially sophisticated theoretical analysis of the impact of term limits, see Linda R.
Cohen, Terms of Office, Legislative Structure, and Collective Incentives, in CONSITUTmONAL REFORM
IN CALIFORNiA, supra note 39, at 239-65.
52. See, e.g., WILL, supra note 50.
53. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-94, supra note 43, at59-60. The only state whose voters have
rejected term limits for state legislators when it has been placed on the ballot is the state of Washington.
Id.
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difference is the length of legislative sessions. Only fifteen states have
unlimited sessions; the remainder have sessions which last anywhere from 45
days (Utah and New Hampshire) to six months.54 That session length has been
seen as an important component of legislative capacity to make, implement,
and oversee public policy is evidenced by the substantial legislative reforms in
the 1960s and 1970s which resulted in significant increases in session length
in many states.55
Another key difference concerns state legislatures' reliance on committees
and subcommittees for the conduct of legislative business. Some state
legislatures rely substantially on legislative committees and subcommittees;
others consider legislative proposals in a much more centralized way, relying
on semi-permanent staff and offices such as the legislative analyst or on party
leadership. One measure of committee influence is the number of standing
committees in a state legislature. The following table describes a measure of
standing committee representation in state legislatures (using the same sample
from Table 1). The number in the right-hand column is the ratio of committees
to chamber size.56
TABLE 2 57






Nebraska (unicameral) 14 0.28
Nevada 20 0.32
New Hampshire 48 0.11
While the variation is rather substantial in this unscientific sample,
evaluation of standing committee number as a measure of committee influence
is imperfect. However, there are a number of studies which indicate that state
legislatures rely significantly on committees to carry out significant lawmaking
functions and vary substantially in the extent of this influence. Keith Ham
and Ronald Hedlund have analyzed a wealth of survey data concerning
54. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-94, supra note 43, at 109-10.
55. See Alan Rosenthal, Reform in State Legislatures, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
LEGISLATURES 837-52 (J. Silbey ed., 1994); see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT CAPACITY (Wash. D.C. 1985).
56. I have included standing committees in both chambers, as well as joint standing committees.
In one of the states listed, Connecticut, all committees are joint.
57. See THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-94, supra note 43, at 157-58.
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legislator opinions on the subject of committee influence.58 They note a
substantial difference, some attributable to the numbers of committees in the
state legislatures and some simply not explained by structural factors. Other
studies confirm the basic hypothesis that committees matter greatly in the state
legislative process even, interestingly, after the wave of state legislative reform
in the 1960s and 1970s. 59 As Hamm and Hedlund note, "[C]ommittees are the
primary means used by legislative bodies to respond in a measured and
reasonable way to the increasing number and range of emerging policy needs
and demands in states."' We lack, however, a sophisticated theory that
explains how and why committee influence on the legislative process varies
from state to state.
In addition to the organizational form of state legislatures, there are
important statutory or constitutional constraints on state lawmaking.61 Two
stand out. One is the requirement in many state constitutions or state statutes
of a balanced budget. Thirty-nine states include in their constitutions a balanced
budget requirement. Thirteen states require a balanced budget by statute.
Vermont is the one state that has no balanced budget requirement.62 The
balanced budget requirement constrains the pattern of legislative expenditures
in important ways. The most conspicuous way is in curtailing the ability of
states to pursue competitive regulatory strategies in the interstate regulatory
marketplace by piling up debt.63 A second structural device is the power of
the governor, in forty-two states, to exercise a line item veto, a device which
58. Keith E. Hanem & Ronald D. Hedlund, Committees in State Legislatures, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES 669-99, 671 at tbl. 1; see also Wayne L. Francis & James W.
Riddlesperger, U.S. State Legislative Committees: Structure, Procedural Efficiency, and Party Control,
7 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 453 (1982).
59. In addition to the studies cited in Hamm & Hedlund, supra note 58, see WAYNE L. FRANCIS,
THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITrEE GAME: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF F= STATES (1989).
60. Hamm & Hedlund, supra note 58, at 672.
61. In focusing on the structural components of lawmaking processes, I have not considered two
important features of democracy within states which are probably pertinent to the consideration of
interstate regulatory competition. The first concerns patterns of participation within the states. For
example, who votes in state elections? How often and on what basis? These questions, along with the
related questions regarding the nature and degree of direct political participation by individuals and
organizations within a state are significant elements of the intrastate aspects of interstate regulatory
competition. For a recent, thorough analysis of contemporary political participation within states, see
KIM QUAiLE HILL, DEMOCRACY IN THE FIFTY STATES 72-89 (1994).
The second feature of democracy that is no doubt pertinent to a complete theory of intrastate
decisionmaking is the role of political parties. Id. at 53-71; Kramer, supra note 15, at 1522-42; see also
Keith E. Hanem, Ronald D. Hedlund & R. Bruce Anderson, Political Parties in State Legislatures, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES 947 (1994).
62. Tony Hutchison & Kathy Jaines, Legislative Budget Procedures in the 50 States: A Guide to
Appropriations and Budget Processes 6-14, Fiscal Affairs Program, Natel Council of State Legislatures
(1988), in TaE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 43.
63. This is not to say, as the literature on unfunded mandates indicates, that states do not have the
ability to "overspend" in ways that get around the balanced budget constraint. See the discussion of the
political economy of unfunded mandates in David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental
Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-18 (1995).
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leaves the governor (and the political party that he or she represents) in a better
position to bargain with legislators from the other party.64 These and other
structural constraints, combined with significant aspects of organizational form,
represent important elements of state legislative processesA And to the extent
that these elements differ from state to state, we find another reason to look
closely at the role of these differences on the capacity of states to engage
profitably in interstate regulatory competition and collaboration.
A final difference in the state legislative process which bears consideration
as we evaluate the intrainstitutional context of regulatory decisionmaking is the
role of the state bureaucracy. Most analyses of regulatory performance that
draw connections among structures of decisionmaking and federalism con-
centrate on the role of the federal bureaucracy on state policymaking
processes.' However, each of the fifty states has its own bureaucracies and
its own administrative agencies. They differ significantly in their architecture,
influence, and attachment to the basic elements of legislative and executive
processes within a given state. As with the other structural elements of
legislative decisionmaking described above, we need to consider the role of
state administrative and regulatory decisionmakers-the so-called "fourth
branch" of government-in order to complete the picture of intrastate
legislative mechanisms.
2. Alternative Forms of Lawmaking
The system of direct democracy represented by the initiative lawmaking
process that exists in certain states is a powerful element in the structure of
regulatory decisionmaking in States. 67 Currently, sixteen states permit voters
to amend the state constitution through initiative. Eighteen states permit
amendment of statutes by initiatives.' As political scientists have repeatedly
reminded us, direct democracy changes legislative incentives; it empowers a
different spectrum of interest groups while disempowering others; and it recre-
ates intrastate political alliances by, among other things, shifting the emphasis
64. See, e.g., I. Gregory Sidak, The Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1498, 1499
& n.7 (1995) (citing effects of line-item veto on behavior of other political actors); see also PAUL
MILOROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 130-31 (1992); THOMAS
C. SCHELUNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-28 (1960); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTrIONS OF CAPITALISM 167 (1985)).
65. Gregory Sidak describes these twin structural devices even more ambitiously: "[C]qonstitutional
reforms like the balanced-budget amendment and the line-item veto are not merely structural
modifications of the operation of the... government. Rather, these reforms protect the liberty and
property of future generations of American citizens." Sidak, supra note 64, at 1499.
66. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
67. On the role ofdirect democracy instate lawmaking, see generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); DAVID MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984).
68. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-94, supra note 43, at 294, tbl. 5.15.
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away from intralegislative deal-making to statewide, retail politics.69 The
entire enterprise is deeply controversial.70 Yet, Americans seem wedded to
their initiative lawmaking system. In California, for example, the initiative
system is a fundamental part of the lawmaking process, having an impact upon
some of the most important and controversial issues of political, economic, and
social life.7 ' The system is fundamental in other states as well.
To the extent that lawmaking by initiative takes decisions out of the
peculiar processes of legislative decisionmaking and puts it into the hands of
the voters at large, those with a stake in regulatory outcomes must appeal not
only to a different lawmaking constituency, but to a fundamentally different
type of constituency. There is no clear opportunity for voters in an initiative
system to engage in logrolling: the monitoring costs would be extraordinary.' I
If we think that the opportunity for cross-issue vote trading is a significant
element in regulatory policymaking,73 then lawmaking through the initiative
system represents, for better or worse, a very different sort of environment for
considering and making regulatory decisions. Moreover, the initiative system
allows issues to be considered by the populace and not by elected officials with
their own, particular self-interests. Term limits and campaign financing reform
are two familiar examples of issues that could not, given legislator self-interest,
be seriously considered within a legislature. The political viability of term
limits and campaign finance reform largely exist only through direct democracy
mechanisms. Regardless of the public policy implications, the key point is that
initiative lawmaking empowers a type of constituency that is represented very
differently in a more republican form of government.
Second, the phenomenon of initiative lawmaking may be expected to have
effects on the decisions made within legislatures. Surely, legislators appreciate
the extent to which they have two different constituencies. They represent the
voters of their district, and they represent the interests of the voters of the state
writ large, who have the capacity to, for instance, use term limits to force them
69. See John Ferejohn, Reforming the Initiative Process, in CONSTTIIruONAL REFORM, supra note
39, at 313-25.
70. See, e.g., David Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 44 (1995); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is
Not 'Republican Government': The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 10 (1993).
71. See WILLIAM DEVERELL & TOM SITrON, CALIFORNIA PROGRESSMISM REvisrrED (1994);
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process:A Proposal to Increase Flexibility and
Legislative Accountability, in CONSrrrtrrONAL REFORM, supra note 39.
72. Consider some of the differences between a legislature and the populace: (1) Votes are cast by
secret ballots in direct democracy, not so in legislatures. So, votes can hardly be bought and sold since
there is no chance of adequate policing; (2) voters are not "repeat players" in the sense that they interact
with one another on a statewide level such that their allegiances and behavior can be watched by others;
(3) voters have no continuing oversight mechanisms to enable them to secure influence over interest
groups, regulated industries or others; their only redress is an initiative that is considered at the next
appropriate election.
73. See, e.g., David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AMER. POL.
Sci. REV. 1181 (1989); Weingast & Marshall, supra note 33.
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out of office, reduce their compensation, constrict their jurisdiction, and
reallocate power to other units of government (e.g., the governor, courts, local
governments). The fact that legislators carry out their functions in the shadow
of this initiative system may well translate into different patterns of legislative
lawmaking. The phenomenon is measurable to some degree. Do we observe
different patterns of lawmaking over a similar range of issues in states than we
do in the U.S. Congress? Are some of these differences attributable to the
absence of a national initiative system? These are among the questions pertinent
to the project of considering to what extent initiative lawmaking matters to the
conduct of interstate regulatory competition.74
Another aspect of alternative forms of lawmaking to note at least in passing
is this: Most states permit some form of initiative lawmaking at the local level.
With respect to certain issues such as zoning, this technique can be a vital part
of the state's regulatory arsenal. Local governments' power to conduct such
initiative lawmaking is for the most part, however, subject to state constraint.
Still, local governments in modern America truly rely upon this form of
lawmaking to assert a variety of public policy agendas, ranging from zoning
out "disfavored" uses of property to enacting local campaign financing and
election laws.
3. Distribution of Powers in the State Government
All states have some form of separation of powers incorporated in their
constitutions. Massachusetts is perhaps the most deliberate in its formulation.
It provides as follows:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of
them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may
be a government of laws and not of men.75
74. With respect to those states which have initiative lawmaking, there are substantial variations
in the mechanics of the process. There are different signature requirements to put an initiative on the
ballot. In Arizona, for example, the initiative proposal must be signed by a number equal to 15% of the
votes cast for the governor in the last election; in Oklahoma, the number is 15 % of the highest vote total
for an office in the last election; in North Dakota, the requirement is 4% of the resident population; in
Colorado, the rather obscure measure is 5% of all votes cast for the office of Secretary of State in the
last election. Perhaps the most interesting variation is Missouri's: 8% of the votes cast for governor,
with the requirement of 8% each from 2/3 of Congressional districts in the state. With respect to the
time period within which signatures can be gathered, there is substantial variation as well. Arizona, for
example, permits 2 years, while Oklahoma allows only 90 days. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1993-94,
supra note 43, at 296-97, tbl. 5.17.
75. MASS. CONSr. art. XXX, I MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 670 (1978).
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The basic principle underlying this particular version of the separation of
powers is shared in each state. The governmental institutions within the state
reflect this principle. Hence, each state has three branches of government; each
state provides that the governor is elected directly by the people. No state
follows an alternative, more parliamentary system of interbranch relationships,
whether or not it would be permitted to do so consistent with the U.S.
Constitution. Therefore, the characteristics that we identify with the so-called
separation of powers are widely shared and, in their basic form, should not
detain us in thinking about varieties of intrastate regulatory processes.
There is considerable variation behind these rather standard formulations.
However, part of these differences stem, no doubt, from continuing controver-
sy over the efficacy of separation of powers as a description of American
government and politics at the end of the twentieth century. At a descriptive
level, our policymaking process does not respect clear lines of division among
branches of government nor does it indicate that there are hermetically sealed
branches of government each with their distinctive powers and roles.76 At the
federal level, we live, as Richard Neustadt observed, in a system of "separated
branches sharing powers." This corresponds pretty well to state decision-
making. Still relevant, though, is how states treat their system of separation of
powers differently.
Consider, for example, how states select their judges. All states but Rhode
Island provide for some limitation on the terms of judges of the state's highest
court;77 state rules frequently limit the number of years a supreme court
justice can sit;7" in other states, there is a "70 and out" rule.79 With respect
to the selection and retention process for lower state court judges, most judges
are elected in some fashion. However, the methods of removal for state judges
at all levels differs substantially from state to state." A standard intuition is
that this electoral check affects judicial performance. A related intuition is that
this diminishes the checking function of the judiciary on nonmajoritarian policy
outcomes and political processes. Whether this surrender of a certain amount
of checks and balances is considered deleterious depends upon one's conception
of the judicial role within a state constitutional order. Moreover, the empirical
question of whether judicial performance is systematically different in states
that tie judges to the electorate more solidly than in those that do not is
controversial. I mean only to underscore the basic point, that the role of the
76. Compare Peter Straus, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984) (proposing functional conception of distribution of
powers) with Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513
(1989) (defending stronger, more formalistic conception of separation of powers).
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judiciary, and the selection of members of the judiciary, affects the distribution
of powers in different ways throughout the fifty states.
4. Individual Rights and Liberties
It is a commonplace to observe that regulatory policy reflects not merely
economic choices made in the name of economic efficiency, the maximization
of social wealth, and/or distributive justice, but also represents fundamental
choices about the nature and scope of individual liberty. In the strongest
version of this claim, it is said that individuals enjoy, or should enjoy, some
sort of a right to a particular distribution of goods and services; naturally, the
establishment and maintenance of such rights would then connect regulatory
policymaking (including interstate regulatory competition) with the constraining
features of enforceable rights and liberties.81 But even the weaker version of
this claim, one that remains agnostic about the proper role of government in
securing a particular mix of regulatory outcomes, believes that regulatory
policies and processes take place in the shadow of persistent claims about
rights.A2
These claims are particularly persistent within states and within the
structures of intrastate decisionmaking. The rights embodied in state constitu-
tions often represent an expansion of certain types of claims against govern-
ment conduct (and claims for certain governmentally provided goods and
services) in ways that affect substantially the structure of regulatory policy-
making. One of the points made repeatedly by those who study interstate
regulatory competition is that people and businesses exercise voice and exit
options in order to secure a particular provision of goods by the governments
of the state and local areas in which they are inclined to locate.' These goods
include rights. And, therefore, it should come as no surprise that states differ
in important respects in the nature and scope of the rights enjoyed by their
citizens. What is more surprising, from the standpoint of standard political
economy theory, is why states share so many rights in common.
For example, consider states that restrict state and local regulation through,
say, requirements of just compensation or protections against the impairment
of contracts. In this regard, the state creates a scheme of limitations on state
regulatory initiatives, limitations that may restrict, in important ways, the
81. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 90-91 (1990) (critiquing "misleading rhetoric of rights" in connection with
regulatory policy).
82. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1 (1995).
83. See generally Been, Land Use Exactions, supra note 18; Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983).
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capacity of states to compete in the interstate regulatory arena.' To be sure,
the federal Constitution establishes various property and contractual rights not
unlike relevant state protections;' but the key difference is that national rights
apply to either, in the case of the Takings Clause, the federal government or,
in the case of the Contract Clause, the states equally; they, in one respect at
least, level the playing field. 86 By contrast, the embodiment of restrictive
rights in state constitutions limits state regulatory power vis-a-vis other states
that do not have these applicable provisions. While the standard "race to the
bottom" rationale would explain why states would eschew these constraints in
order to maximize their competitive position, it is notable that all state
constitutions have some form of both just compensation and protection against
impairment of contracts, although both of these provisions seem to restrict
rather than to facilitate the state's regulatory position. Surely we must look
beyond "race to the bottom" theories to explain the durability of these
constitutional rights.
5. The Relationship Between State and Local Governments
Richard Briffault uses the helpful term "localism" to describe the
constitutional relationship between state and local governments in American
law s7 Although localism is pertinent to the vast range of issues that state
governments consider in day-to-day policymaking and is especially pertinent
to the pattern of regulatory decisions made, it is virtually ignored in contempo-
rary debates about federalism. The omission is critical, for it is only in
understanding the way in which the relationships between state and local
governments are, first, constructed by state constitutions and, second, work in
practice, that we can sensibly evaluate arguments about the efficacy of
interstate regulatory competition. 8 To put the matter simply at the outset:
States are not unitary actors, but are made up of a variety of influential,
heterogeneous local units of government; these units construct state regulatory
decisionmaking; they also constrain it in important ways. Therefore, the
interrelationship between state and local governments is what defines the notion
of the "state." Correlatively, this interrelationship is what helps define the
scope of state power and state polieymaking processes.
A standard maxim in the literature on state and local government is that
84. Some form of protection of so-called economic rights, through eminent domain and contractual
protections, exist in every state, although the form of such rights vary.
85. See U.S. CONSr. amend. V.
86. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); Home Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
87. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REy. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism]; Richard Briffault, Localism in State
Constitutional Law, 496 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC!. 117 (1988).
88. See Briffault, WhatAbout the "Ism"?, supra note 6, at 1303, 1307-09.
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local governments are creatures of state governments, depending upon them for
their existence and for their authority.89 We have long rejected, it is said, the
notion that there is inherent local power.90 True enough; however, this
description of the formal relationship between state and local power is vastly
underinclusive as an analysis of the realities of state/local relationships. 91 To
begin with, many states have ceded to local governments a modicum of
sovereign power through the provision of home rule.' But even with respect
to the range of power that is not subject to local sovereignty-which, after all,
is most of the relevant regulatory power within a state-local governments
form constituencies that seek, and occasionally enjoy, influence on state
policymaking. Local governments have two separate, but vital, qualities that
ensure their persistent influence over fundamental policy choices within state
government. One quality is that they constitute a relevant interest group in the
state political process; 93 they clamor for resources and also for a certain level
of freedom from imposition of state commands. For example, the conspicuous
debate over unfunded state mandates reflects at its core debates about
how-and whether-local interests are to be adequately represented in state
decisionmaking. As a general rule, local governments seem to fare rather
well (compared with the state government vis-a-vis the national government
until just recently) in securing constitutional or legislative protection against
unfunded mandates. 95 With respect to other issues, especially where there is
a zero-sum choice between the burden borne by statewide constituencies and
the constituencies represented by several local governments, localities fare
considerably less well. That local governments form important, ubiquitous
interest groups, though, is the essential point here.
Another way in which local governments are critical in structuring
intrastate regulatory decisionmaking and thus implicate interstate competition
is with respect to the continuing burdens they bear in collecting local revenues
and in distributing public goods in the manner demanded by local constituen-
89. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
90. See, e.g., Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1114-15 (1980);
Howard L. MeBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV.
190, 216 (1916).
91. See generally CLAYTON GILLETrE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, Ch. 3 ("The Community's
Relationship with the State") (1994); Briffault, OurLocalism, supra note 87.
92. See GiLLETrE, supra note 34, at 301-47; Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power
under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MiNN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
93. C f. Clayton Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify
Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991) (considering questions of interest group
and capture in context of local decisionmaking contexts).
94. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism andRegulation, in TrE REAGAN
REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 11 (G. Eads & M. Fix eds., 1984); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest,
and Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1993).
95. See generally GILLETTE, supra note 34, at 507-11.
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cies-in other words, in the way local units of government manage their local
fiscal affairs.' Under one plausible model of state/local relations, local
governments are mere administrative arms of the central, state government.
When they are useful in implementing state goals, states will rely on them;
when they cease to be useful, that is, when it is more efficient to manage the
collection and distribution functions of public goods provision through a more
centralized mechanism, local governments will be replaced. This model
contemplates an entirely functional and hierarchical view of the proper distribu-
tion of powers, one that builds from the essential premise that the state may do
what it wishes with its "agents." Other models, though, contemplate a more
independent, and more complex, relationship between the state and local
governments. One strand emphasizes the value of local governments as fora for
participatory democracy and "communitarian" values,' values that are not
easily realized at the statewide level. Another strand emphasizes that even if
we believe that form should follow function, we might want to establish and
maintain solid spheres of local decisionmaking units, resistant to reincorpor-
ation by the states into more centralized structures.
These are not merely different normative models of how we may want to
see localism constructed in the abstract; they also jibe with the structures of
localism in particular states. While scholars of localism insist, partly because
it is precisely the nature of the enterprise, that we might develop general
principles and premises for state/local relationships in all fifty states, it is more
credible to believe that some states require structural and institutional
relationships among units of government that are distinct from those required
in other states. Simply put, different states have different economic, political,
and social requirements; they also have distinct cultures and histories which
make a general theory of localism unlikely.
Nonetheless, it is important to the project outlined at the beginning and at
the end of this paper to consider more systematically the nature and structure
of localism as it is constructed in different states. After all, we may discover
that the principles of localism are properly generalizable; perhaps localism
shares in common with federalism, as described by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution, the idea that there is an appropriate distribution between layers
of government that can be spelled out in an ideal constitutional form. What we
are more likely to find, I predict, is that states have quite distinct views about
the proper relationships among different units of government in their respective
states. There is some evidence of this on the surface of the matter, after all:
The variation, for example, in the number of special districts in different states
96. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972).
97. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 90, at 1153-54.
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is tremendous;98 and, although less variable, there are substantial differences
in the sorts of revenue-raising devices employed in different states.99 To be
sure, some of these differences reflect mere differences of technique; but others
represent more basic variations embodied in contrasting constitutional
structures and in state constitutional law."°
The hard normative questions raised by this tour through state institutional
regulatory processes are two-fold. First, what follows, for our law of federal-
ism, from the fact of meaningful state variation? Perhaps nothing; there are,
after all, a number of powerful reasons for the equalization of state regulatory
decisionmaking through a uniform set of constitutional rules (most of these
reasons start from a baseline of three words: "Articles of Confederation"). But
perhaps much follows, in terms of how we might structure legal rules to
encourage states to develop tools to carry out the regulatory goals that we as
simultaneous citizens of local, state, and national communities aim to
accomplish. Second, what follows for our politics of federalism? In other
words, what should we expect from the national legislature in creating and
implementing regulatory policy, in light of the impact of these national
decisions on the processes of decisionmaking in state and local governments?
CONCLUSION
This Article has raised a number of different issues for further thought.
98. The following table gives a sense of the range among states:












BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1992 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS VOL. 1, No.
1, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION at 3 (1994).
99. See GILEMrE, supra note 34, at 423-696.
100. One is the requirement, expressed in every state Constitution, of equal treatment and,
relatedly, of the prohibition against "special legislation." Both of these requirements are designed to
ensure that the state may not single out particular localities for disfavored treatment; legislation which
deals with the architecture and powers of local governments must apply to such governments on an equal
basis. To be sure, general law will have differential impacts; but the state laws must be designed, at
least, to apply equally to localities within the state. This mechanism limits the capacity of Oceana, the
hypothetical state of the preceding Section of this Article, to single out Xanadu for special treatment,
either by specifically proscribing local taxes or by exempting the local government from the general
strictures of state law.
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Some may lead to dead ends. After all, intrastate institutional mechanisms may,
in some contexts and for some reasons, be far less conspicuous and far less
significant for the state's competitive posture than other elements, such as its
size, its population, and its economic condition. Other lines of analysis,
though, may bear more fruit. There are number of hypotheses one might
formulate whose consideration may yield richer predictions about the role of
intrastate mechanisms on regulatory competition:
9 The larger the size of legislative chambers in a state, the fewer the
number of legislative rules, statutes, etc., there will be to facilitate the ability
of states to compete in the regulatory marketplace. The reason is that larger
chambers mean smaller legislative constituencies and, therefore, a greater
chance that localities (and locally organized interest groups) will be able to
thwart initiatives that benefit the state as a whole.
* In states that have, and frequently rely upon, initiatives, referenda, and
other alternative forms of lawmaking (e.g., local initiatives), there are a greater
number of state regulatory laws that deal with statewide, non-parochial,
interests.
* In states that enable the state legislature to decide whether a certain policy
issue involves a matter of statewide, as opposed to purely local, concern, we
see a greater quantity and "quality" of state laws that respond to the statewide
interests in facilitating regulatory competition. Correspondingly, we see less
maneuvering room for local governments to collaborate with one another, with
other states, with other localities, and with the federal government.
* In states with a more attenuated electoral constraint on judges (e.g.,
longer terms of office), we see a greater independence and, correspondingly,
a decreased willingness to decide regulatory matters in a way that promotes
state regulatory interests vis-a-vis other states. (This hypothesis, of course,
presupposes something as well about the incentives faced by the so-called
"independent" judiciary).
The message of this Article is not especially tied to the plausibility of these
hypotheses. Its ambition, as stated at the outset, is more limited: to suggest that
our conversations about interstate regulatory competition/collaboration and
about federalism would be greatly enriched by paying more careful attention
to the relationship between interstate regulatory policymaking and intrastate
institutional mechanisms and structures.
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